Political Science

Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Robert Nozick

Anarchy, State, and Utopia cover

Nozick's classic defence of the minimal state, written in reply to Rawls. He argues that individuals have rights so strong that only a state limited to protection against force, theft, fraud and breach of contract is justified, and that more extensive states violate those rights.

Prerequisites

Some familiarity with Rawls's A Theory of Justice and basic philosophical argument is helpful.

Publication Year
2013
Difficulty Level
Intermediate
Academic Level
Undergraduate
libertarianismpolitical philosophyjusticeminimal stateclassic

01 / Reading Guide

Reading Guide

Citation

Nozick, R. (2013). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books. Foreword by Thomas Nagel. First published 1974.

Chapter Summary

The book has three parts and ten chapters. The 2013 edition runs to 400 pages, and the 1974 edition has 367. Its opening sentence holds that individuals have rights and that there are things no person or group may do to them without violating those rights. Part I defends the minimal state against the anarchist. Part II argues that no more extensive state can be justified. Part III offers a framework for utopia that Nozick presents as equivalent to the minimal state. The publisher describes the book as written in response to John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. It won the 1975 National Book Award. Not every chapter is named below.

Foreword to the 2013 edition

The 2013 reissue carries a new foreword by the philosopher Thomas Nagel. Nagel had earlier published an article on the book, "Libertarianism without Foundations" (1975), which the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy cites on the question of the book's foundations.

Part I, Chapters 2–4: The State of Nature; Moral Constraints and the State; Prohibition, Compensation, and Risk

Part I is titled "State-of-Nature Theory, or How to Back into a State without Really Trying". It asks what Nozick treats as the fundamental question of political philosophy: whether there should be any state at all. It then answers the individualist anarchist who says even a minimal state is unjustified. The answer is an invisible-hand explanation. Starting from a state of nature, protective associations arise and one becomes dominant. A minimal state follows without anyone intending it and without violating anyone's rights. The rights and "side constraints" that frame the argument, based on the separateness of persons, belong to this part, and the title of Chapter 3, "Moral Constraints and the State", points there. Chapter 4 asks whether every action that crosses a boundary may be prohibited. It answers that some may be permitted if compensation is paid. The remaining chapters of Part I are not named here, though the Berkeley summer course assigns a short passage from Chapter 5 (see "Common course assignments" below).

Part II, Chapters 7–9: Distributive Justice; Equality, Envy, Exploitation, Etc.; Demoktesis

Part II is titled "Beyond the Minimal State?". Chapter 7 sets out the historical entitlement conception of justice in holdings and argues against end-state and patterned principles. Rawls's difference principle is the main target. The chapter includes the Wilt Chamberlain argument, discussed under the heading "How Liberty Upsets Patterns", and ends with thoughts on rectification. Chapter 8 answers the considerations offered for a more extensive state, including equality, equal opportunity, meaningful work, workers' control and exploitation, and it includes a critique of Marxism. Chapter 9 builds an invisible-hand account of how a democratic totalitarian state could arise through only morally permissible steps.

Part III, Chapter 10: A Framework for Utopia

Part III consists of this one chapter. It argues that the minimal state is also inspiring, because it resembles a framework in which voluntarily formed communities coexist and individuals may join or leave them. It distinguishes existential, missionary and imperialistic utopians. It also offers a route to the minimal state that does not rest on the rights argued for in Parts I and II.

Key Concepts

Part I: The Minimal State

  • Side constraints: absolute limits on what may be done to individuals, derived from their separate existence.
  • Ultraminimal and minimal state: the stages of the invisible-hand account, from a dominant protective agency to a state that protects everyone.
  • Compensation: the idea in Chapter 4 that some boundary crossings are permissible if due compensation is paid.

Parts II and III: Justice and Utopia

  • Entitlement theory: the historical conception of justice in holdings, as opposed to end-state and patterned principles.
  • Wilt Chamberlain argument: the thought experiment showing, in Nozick's view, how liberty disturbs patterned distributions.
  • Demoktesis: the invisible-hand construction of a democratic state in Chapter 9.
  • Framework for utopia: the structure of voluntary communities in Chapter 10.

Critical Analysis

Strengths

  • A sustained argument with a rival. The publisher presents the book as a response to Rawls. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry by Eric Mack says that Nozick presses the anti-consequentialist side of Rawls's work further, so the two books can be read as a pair.
  • Reach beyond the main thesis. Mack notes that the book contains many "rich and intriguing side discussions" beyond the four topics he treats. The Hachette page lists its recognition: a 1975 National Book Award and a place among the Times Literary Supplement's 100 most influential books since the war.
  • A distinctive structure. The three parts give three kinds of case for the minimal state: a rights-based defence against the anarchist, a critique of more extensive states, and a utopian route that does not depend on the first two.
  • Two arguments that can be taught separately. Recent courses show that the rights material of Chapter 3 and the justice material of Chapter 7 can each stand as a teaching unit; the Pomona course listed below, for example, assigns separate readings under "Rights" and "Justice". The book can therefore be taught in excerpt as well as whole.

Limitations

  • The foundations of rights. Mack writes that it is a commonplace that the book gives no foundation for its natural rights. Nozick himself says the book offers no precise theory of their moral basis, and the title of Nagel's 1975 article makes the same point.
  • Difficulty. Mack describes Chapter 4 as very complex. The book argues philosophically through thought experiments, and the publisher lists no study aids. Neither of the recent syllabi listed below assigns Chapter 4.
  • A thin bridge to rights. Mack also judges that the book suggests, but does not compellingly argue, the step from the separateness of persons to strong individual rights.
  • A 1974 text. The 2013 edition adds a foreword, but the argument predates later debates, such as the discussion of group difference in Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference.

Where It Fits in the Course

In the modern political thought list, Nozick is the libertarian counterpart to Rawls. A Theory of Justice develops the original position and the veil of ignorance to argue for justice as fairness, and Nozick's Part II engages its distributive principles. The usual order is Rawls first, then Nozick, which is why some familiarity with Rawls helps.

The book appears both in dedicated justice courses and in general political philosophy surveys. The Berkeley summer course on theories of justice listed below uses it as a set textbook and covers it over two consecutive class days. The Pomona political philosophy course draws on it for separate units on rights and on justice. Both courses concentrate on the side-constraints material of Chapter 3 and the entitlement theory of Chapter 7, the parts that bear most directly on the debate with Rawls.

Kymlicka's Contemporary Political Philosophy is a survey whose chapter on libertarianism reconstructs Nozick's entitlement theory and self-ownership principle, so reading that chapter first gives a map of the argument. Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference questions the distributive paradigm that dominated the theory of justice after Rawls and takes the debate in a different direction. Adam Swift's Political Philosophy: A Beginners' Guide, organised around political values, is a short and gentler introduction to the vocabulary of liberty, equality and justice that Nozick uses.

How to Use This Book

The book suits undergraduates who have already met Rawls or who read it alongside a survey such as Kymlicka. The publisher presents the reissue as an introduction to Nozick for a new generation of readers. In practice, though, it assumes a willingness to follow philosophical argument.

  • Order: read the foreword (or Nozick's own preface, which Berkeley assigns), then Part I. Concentrate on the account of rights and side constraints (Chapter 3) and the invisible-hand argument.
  • Core: Chapter 7, which most of the philosophical commentary addresses, and Chapter 10 for the independent route to the minimal state.
  • Optional: Chapter 4 is difficult and can wait until after a first pass. Chapter 8 (with its critique of Marxism) and Chapter 9 (on democracy) can be read separately in courses on Marxism or democratic theory.
  • Alongside: the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Nozick's political philosophy, for orientation and objections.
  • Practice: reconstruct the Wilt Chamberlain argument in numbered steps and identify which premise a defender of Rawls would reject.

Common course assignments

Two recent syllabi give concrete reading paths that are shorter than the full ten chapters.

  • UC Berkeley, LEGALST 107 Theories of Justice (Summer Session D 2024), using the Basic Books 2013 printing (ISBN 9780465063741):
    • Day 1 (Wed 10 July): the preface (pp. xix–xxiv); all of Chapter 2; pp. 26–35 and 48–53 of Chapter 3; pp. 113–119 of Chapter 5.
    • Day 2 (Thu 11 July): pp. 149–164 and 167–182 of Chapter 7.
  • Pomona College, Philosophy 33 Political Philosophy (Fall 2024):
    • Rights: pp. 26–53.
    • Justice: pp. 149–64 and 167–82.

The two paths overlap closely. Both assign the same two Chapter 7 passages. Pomona's rights reading covers the whole span (pp. 26–53) from which Berkeley selects two shorter passages. Berkeley adds the state-of-nature setting (Chapter 2) and a short passage from Chapter 5, so it covers more of the Part I argument for the minimal state. Neither assigns Chapter 4, Chapters 8–9 or Chapter 10. If you are reading on your own, the Berkeley path is a good minimum. Add Chapter 10 if you want the utopian argument that the course excerpts leave out.

Edition notes

The page numbers above come from the Basic Books 2013 printing listed on the Berkeley syllabus, ISBN 9780465063741. That ISBN differs from the edition listed here (9780465051007), so check your copy's pagination against the course edition before relying on page ranges. Do the same before using Pomona's page ranges.